The Root of All Corruption? Non-Executive Directorships
Our investigation into corporate misconduct across property, finance, and insurance has revealed a common enabler: the systemic misuse of non-executive directorships (NEDs).
Designed to provide independent oversight, these roles have instead become a shield for misconduct. Our research has identified cases where individuals receive six figure amounts per year for as little as 10 days of work — typically reading briefing papers and attending a few meetings. These positions rarely carry consequences, even when the companies involved engage in fraud, concealment, or endanger public safety.
One former non-executive director of a global insurance firm (previously CFO of bank) told PropertyCorruption.com, “About half the meetings seemed performative, with some NEDs not even attending or providing feedback to the briefing packs.” They went on to describe the role as feeling more like a quiet reward than a duty — a well-paid gesture of loyalty rather than genuine oversight. In their words, “It often felt like a legalised bribe — a way to keep influential people close, without expecting them to actually intervene.”
Far from independent, many NEDs are appointed through personal networks. They often sit on multiple interconnected boards, creating a web of influence where accountability disappears. This structure actively suppresses internal risk reports, blocks whistleblowers, and maintains inflated credit scores — even in companies facing serious ethical and financial exposure.
We believe real reform is essential. That means:
- Limiting how many boards one person can sit on,
- Disclosing all cross-directorships publicly,
- Making NED appointments independent of insider influence, and
- Holding NEDs accountable when governance fails on their watch.
Until this happens, non-executive directorships will remain a systemic blind spot — and a key engine of hidden corporate corruption.
Non-executive directorships are often framed as independent oversight roles, but in practice they’ve become a post-career stepping stone for many former CEOs, CFOs, and regulators. Our research shows a clear pattern: upon retirement, it’s common for senior executives to take on two or three NED positions — often within industries they once oversaw or regulated. This entrenched practice makes conflicts of interest harder to define, let alone prove, as influence is passed on informally through networks rather than official roles.
This is why our approach goes beyond surface-level disclosures. We trace the historical movement of NEDs between companies — especially within sectors plagued by repeated scandals, such as property and insurance. By mapping these appointments over time, we uncover patterns of quiet recycling: the same individuals (or their close peers and predecessors) appearing again and again across boards with a track record of regulatory failure or misconduct.
In doing so, we also examine the peer networks that shape these appointments — identifying which firms senior figures tend to “retire into,” and how these placements correspond to past relationships, shared histories, or overlapping timelines during controversial periods. It’s not always about a single conflict of interest, but about a systemic pattern of entanglement where independence is a fiction, and oversight becomes a ritual — not a safeguard.
If, for example, a CEO or CFO was involved in serious governance failures or credible allegations of corruption during their final executive role, there should be mechanisms in place to restrict or block their eligibility for future NED appointments. Without such consequences, the system effectively rewards silence and complicity — allowing individuals to exit high-pressure roles without accountability, only to resurface in lucrative “oversight” positions. Introducing a formal review process tied to past conduct could create meaningful incentives for transparency and ethical behaviour while in power.
Stay tuned for Sept 2025 when we launch our expose of the hidden NED networks within big business.