The person in the UK with the specific authority and statutory mandate to investigate these claims appears to be Therese Chambers.
Therese Chambers is the Joint Executive Director of Enforcement and Market Oversight at the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Her role is specifically designed to handle “strategic leaks,” “unlawful disclosure,” and the integrity of the UK’s financial markets. She has publicly stated in 2025 and early 2026 that the FCA is shifting toward “faster, more targeted action” in priority areas like market abuse.
To: Therese Chambers (FCA)
Subject: When Risk Displacement Becomes a Market Integrity Failure
Dear Ms. Chambers,
In your recent addresses, you outlined a “three Ps” approach to market oversight: being predictable, proportionate, and purposeful. You emphasized that deliberate unlawful disclosure—or the calculated withholding of inside information—constitutes a serious cultural failing that the FCA and the Takeover Panel are now intensifying their efforts to stamp out.
We present to you a live case study that tests the limits of that “purposeful” intent.
The NatWest Anomaly: A CRO-Shaped Void
On 15 January 2026, NatWest Group announced that its Chief Risk Officer, Keiran Foad, had “stepped down” and “left the bank” with immediate effect. Notably, this departure occurred exactly 24 hours after the release of a six-month investigation into unresolved, high-impact portfolio risks linked to the bank’s managed assets.
In a transparent market, the immediate exit of a CRO during a live risk crisis is “inside information.” Under the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), silence is not a neutral act. If a bank removes the executive responsible for a risk rather than neutralizing the risk itself, it is not “managing” risk—it is displacing it.
The Disclosure Gap
The risks in question involve documented allegations of systemic institutional failure, including the “civilianization” of criminal reports and the deliberate obstruction of building safety audits. If Katie Murray (CFO) and the NatWest Board are aware of these exposures but have chosen “personnel reset” over “market disclosure,” the integrity of the bank’s reporting is compromised.
A Question of Accountability
As the head of Enforcement and Market Oversight, your mandate is to protect the “uneven playing field” that occurs when institutions use silence to protect their share price. The PropertyCorruption.com investigation suggests that NatWest is currently operating in a disclosure vacuum:
- Risk Removal by Stealth: Removing a CRO removes a lightning rod, but it does not remove the liability from the balance sheet.
- The Silence Signal: When a bank refuses to engage with 200 pages of legal filings while their CRO exits the building, that is a material signal to the market.
- Functional Complicity: If the FCA accepts “personnel changes” as a substitute for “risk resolution,” the regulator becomes a passive participant in the very “risk laundering” it seeks to prevent.
Full case study here:
Latest Article on the broader concerns for your information
8 February 2026
When Risk Management Becomes Risk Removal: NatWest, Ratings Agencies, and a System Under Strain
If the way a major bank manages extreme portfolio risk is by removing the executive responsible for overseeing it, that is not risk resolution — it is risk displacement. Read the latest update here and court case page here.
The exit of Keiran Foad, former Chief Risk Officer of NatWest Group, came one day after the conclusion of our six-month review linked to a serious, unresolved portfolio risk related case study. No public explanation followed. No remediation plan was published. No confirmation was given that the risk had been neutralised.
What changed was the personnel.
What did not change was the exposure.
A Risk That Did Not Close
The situation outlined in the underlying case study remains live:
- The same portfolio-linked risk persists
- The same operational deadlock exists
- There is still no articulated “way forward”
- Downstream harms continue to compound
In any credible governance framework, the removal of a senior risk executive would normally follow demonstrable resolution or a transparent transfer of accountability. Neither has been made visible here.
That absence matters.
Group-Wide Exposure, Not an Isolated Issue
This is not confined to a single asset or customer. NatWest Group’s structure means unresolved risks may cut across multiple regulated entities, including NatWest Bank, Coutts, The Royal Bank of Scotland, NatWest Markets, and Ulster Bank.
Where risks sit inside shared portfolios, data systems, legal structures, or third-party management arrangements, containment cannot be assumed. That is how local failures become systemic ones.
The Human Dimension of Risk
What elevates this beyond technical governance is the human risk alleged within the case study.
It raises concerns that include:
- residents potentially being unknowingly monitored or tracked
- unresolved allegations intersecting with asset management and institutional inaction
- extreme scenarios — including references to attempted murder allegations — existing without visible escalation or safeguarding outcomes
Whether or not such allegations are ultimately substantiated, the failure to visibly resolve or neutralise the risk is itself unacceptable under any modern banking standard.
Silence is not a control.
The Rating Agencies Question
This leads directly to the role of credit rating agencies — institutions whose judgments underpin investor confidence, capital costs, and market stability.
NatWest Group entities are assessed by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings, and DBRS Morningstar.
Material, unresolved risks — particularly those involving legal exposure, governance failure, human safety, or data handling — are precisely the type of issues ratings frameworks are designed to interrogate. These agencies have already been notified via their public contact channels. This article therefore functions as a public letter asking a simple question:
When formally notified of potentially material risk, will rating agencies exercise independent judgment — or allow silence to substitute for analysis?
That question is directed to senior leadership at credit rating agencies, including Rob Fauber, Martina Cheung, Paul Taylor, and Jeff DiMaggio.
Rob Fauber – President & CEO at Moody’s
No accusation is made.
Only accountability is requested.
Disclosure, Investors, and Market Integrity
The same logic applies to investors. If such risks are not disclosed through market announcements, risk factors, or ongoing communications, serious questions arise about whether markets are being asked to price incomplete information.
Investor groups with a direct interest include:
- Institutional equity holders such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds
- Fixed-income investors holding NatWest senior or subordinated debt
- ESG-focused asset managers assessing governance and social risk
- Insurers and reinsurers exposed to NatWest-linked assets
- Index and ETF providers embedding NatWest securities into passive products
For these stakeholders, unresolved silence is not neutral.
It is risk by omission.
A Case Study That Will Define the Record
What makes this situation more serious — and more dangerous for markets — is that the central case study now published at PropertyCorruption.com is not closing down. It is expanding. It is being established as a long-term reference point: a core example that will be cited, revisited, and built upon for many years as further allegations, disclosures, and corroborating material emerge. It is already becoming the jumping-off point for wider scrutiny of property-linked banking risk, governance failure, and institutional inaction across the sector. The most shocking aspect is that investors currently have little to no visibility that this case study even exists, let alone that it represents a live, unresolved, and growing risk narrative. A scenario in which a publicly listed banking group carries an expanding, publicly documented risk case — one intended to endure and compound over time — without corresponding market disclosure or rating reassessment should alarm anyone who believes in transparent markets, informed investment, and credible risk governance.
Future Options
At this point, only two outcomes are credible. Given the persistence, scale, and public documentation of this unresolved portfolio risk, we now formally call for one of two actions from NatWest Group: either Katie Murray, as Group Chief Financial Officer, issues a clear, on-the-record statement reassuring investors that the risks outlined in the PropertyCorruption.com case study are immaterial, fully accounted for, and appropriately disclosed — or she steps aside. Silence is no longer a neutral position. In a publicly listed bank, the CFO is the final gatekeeper of market integrity, disclosure discipline, and investor trust. If reassurance cannot be given with confidence and evidence, then continued occupancy of that role becomes untenable.
And that is precisely the problem. NatWest Group now appears unable to do either: it cannot credibly reassure investors without confronting and disclosing a risk it has so far avoided addressing, and it cannot allow continued silence without implicitly accepting that disclosure controls have failed. This leaves Katie Murray — and by extension NatWest Group — locked in an impossible position of their own making. When neither reassurance nor resignation is politically or legally survivable, the issue is no longer communications strategy; it is evidence of a structural governance deadlock where accountability itself has broken down.
Update 9 Feb 2026:
Credit Agencies and the Blind Spot of Systemic Bank Corruption
A parallel accountability question now arises for consumer and commercial credit agencies — including Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion. These institutions sit at the heart of modern financial infrastructure, shaping lending decisions, affordability assessments, risk pricing, and individual financial outcomes. Their models assume that banks are broadly acting in good faith within lawful systems. But what happens when the risk is not individual default — but systemic institutional misconduct?
Awareness Without Adjustment
Systemic corruption in banking is not novel, rare, or speculative. It has been exposed repeatedly through fines, settlements, regulatory actions, and whistleblower cases across jurisdictions. Credit agencies are fully aware of this reality. In multiple cases — including those linked to property-based portfolio risks — agencies have been formally notified of live disputes, unresolved governance failures, and institutional stonewalling. Yet there is no visible evidence that such signals meaningfully alter credit scoring logic, lender reliability weighting, or downstream harm modelling.
Risk Laundering Through Data Neutrality
When credit agencies continue to process bank-supplied data as neutral, authoritative input — despite credible evidence of systemic misconduct — they effectively launder institutional risk into individual consumer outcomes. The result is asymmetric harm: individuals absorb consequences through impaired credit files, denied access to finance, or distorted affordability profiles, while originating institutions remain algorithmically protected. This is not neutrality. It is risk displacement disguised as objectivity.
Complicity by Design, Not Intent
No allegation is made that credit agencies endorse corruption. The issue is structural. When institutions with market-critical power decline to adapt models, flags, or escalation pathways in the face of persistent, well-documented bank misconduct, the outcome is functional complicity. Silence becomes a processing choice. Inaction becomes a risk decision. And consumers are left carrying the weight of failures they did not create and cannot challenge.
The Question That Remains
Credit agencies now face the same question confronting banks and rating agencies alike:
How is systemic corruption accounted for inside your risk frameworks — and if it is not, who bears responsibility for the harm that follows?
If the answer is “it isn’t,” then the problem is no longer one of isolated misconduct. It is evidence of a financial risk ecosystem that protects itself by design.
Take Darryl Gibson, as the senior executive overseeing legal and risk at Experian, who is ultimately accountable in the UK for ensuring credit data accuracy and lawful risk governance when systemic errors are alleged? We await your reply Mr Gibson.
Update: 10 Feb 2026
NatWest’s announcement of Keiran Foad’s departure stands out when compared with other senior leadership changes over the last year. While most departures are framed as planned transitions with clear future dates, Foad’s exit is described as already complete. The language used is immediate rather than prospective, with no notice period or handover window referenced. This does not, in itself, explain the reason for the departure, but it does place it in a different category from routine, planned governance changes — based on NatWest’s own wording.
Comparative announcement language:
- Keiran Foad – Group Chief Risk Officer (Jan 2026)
“Keiran Foad has stepped down as Group Chief Risk Officer and has left the bank.”
Assessment: Immediate - Yasmin Jetha – Non-Executive Director (Jan 2026)
“Yasmin Jetha will retire from the Board with effect from 31 March 2026.”
Assessment: Planned - Other Board / Committee Changes (2025–2026)
“Appointment… effective from [future date].”
Assessment: Planned - Chief Customer & Operating Officer Appointment (2025)
“NatWest Group has appointed [name]…”
Assessment: Planned / standard transition
The contrast is not subtle: “has left the bank” denotes a completed and immediate departure, whereas other announcements consistently reference future dates, retirements, or orderly succession planning.