Chris Oakley The founder and Executive Chairman of Oakley Property

How could Oakley Property possibly recover from its current predicament?

That is not a rhetorical question. It is now a practical one.

Because if we take the building at the centre of the scandal as the test case, the issue is no longer simply whether Oakley Property has handled one resident, one complaint, or one dispute badly. The issue is whether Oakley Property is still capable of performing the basic functions of a managing agent at all.

A managing agent is not paid to disappear when scrutiny becomes uncomfortable. It is not paid to hold meetings only while residents remain manageable. It is not paid to collect service charges selectively, ignore arrears, fake service charge documents, fail to answer safety questions, and then retreat into silence when its own conduct becomes the issue.

The building at the centre of the corruption allegations now appears to show something far more serious than poor communication. It appears to show operational withdrawal.

And that raises an obvious question for every freeholder, RTM company, residents’ management company, leaseholder, insurer, solicitor, buyer, and seller connected to Oakley Property’s wider portfolio:

If this is how Oakley behaves in the building under the most scrutiny, what confidence can anyone have in the rest of the portfolio?

Giving Up On Leaseholder Meetings

Period	Date	Status
February 2025	12/02/2025	Leaseholder meeting held
June 2025	09/06/2025	Leaseholder meeting held
September 2025	26/09/2025	Leaseholder meeting held
December 2025	Expected	Not held
March 2026	Expected	Replaced by closed-attendance RTM AGM
June 2026	Expected by 05/06/2026	Nothing booked

Example Response to Attacks On Residents:

First, Oakley claimed the key CCTV camera covering the area of one attack had been “damaged in an accident.”
Then, after pressure, they contradicted themselves, stating all footage had in fact been retained.
Finally, they refused to release the footage unless requested by police — who themselves are now refusing to provide incident logs.

Giving up on Enforcing Service Charges for 21 Months.

See article here for details.

Faking Service Charge History

The Bigger Picture

We provide details of the broader scandal below — a scandal that is likely to haunt Oakley Property for as long as is able to operate.

The Broader Scandal

Will Paul Thwaite’s Appointment of a New CRO Curb the NatWest Scandal?

Paul Thwaite NatWest Group CEO

6 June 2026

When a Group Chief Risk Officer is appointed at a FTSE 100 bank, the decision is not made by one individual acting alone. The appointment passes through the highest levels of the organisation, involving the Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors, the Board Nominations Committee, senior governance functions, and ultimately the UK regulatory approval process. By the time any appointment is announced, the appointment would have already survived multiple layers of review and scrutiny.

NatWest announced the appointment of Abib Bocresion as its new Group Chief Risk Officer, with the appointment taking effect on 1 July 2026 subject to regulatory approval. Bocresion was not recruited from outside the organisation. Having joined NatWest Markets as Chief Risk Officer in April 2025, he already sat within the bank’s risk leadership structure, reporting to NatWest Markets CEO Jonathan Peberdy with an additional reporting line into then Group Chief Risk Officer Keiran Foad. As a result, his appointment is not merely the arrival of a new executive. It represents the transfer of responsibility for every unresolved risk, escalation, and governance question that survived the abrupt departure of his predecessor.

The central question is what, exactly, NatWest’s Board, senior leadership, and regulators believed they were handing to him. Was he given a stable and well-governed risk function, or did he inherit unresolved issues, unanswered escalations, and risks that had already been sitting within the organisation for months? We can’t help wondering whether the mess of the NatWest Scandal is rooted in CEO Paul Thwaite’s lack of experience for his role, from The Guardian:

Also, Bocresion cannot be presented as someone who arrived at NatWest Group Risk with no prior notice of the NatWest Scandal. On 8 February 2026, PropertyCorruption.com emailed him directly (see below) at NatWest, copying NatWest Markets CEO Jonathan Peberdy and other NatWest personnel, expressly stating that the site was conducting a deep-dive review of NatWest’s risk function, including NatWest Markets. The email linked to the mission page, the latest NatWest-related case study update, and the NatWest/TLT case study homepage. That email was opened, and the read receipt will be published with this article. This means that before Bocresion was announced as Group Chief Risk Officer, he had already been directly notified that NatWest’s risk governance was under public scrutiny. The issue is therefore not merely what he inherited on appointment, but what NatWest’s risk leadership had already been told before promoting him into the Group role.

Email sent

The context into which Abib Bocresion was promoted becomes more interesting when viewed against the departure of his predecessor, Keiran Foad. On 15 January 2026, Foad stepped down as NatWest’s Group Chief Risk Officer and left the bank immediately (the day after the draft version of this article was sent to Mr Foad and NatWest). NatWest described the move as a routine departure, but the mechanics differed sharply from the bank’s previous CRO transition. When former CRO Bruce Fletcher retired, NatWest announced the change on 1 December 2022, named Foad as successor in the same announcement, provided roughly six months’ notice, and maintained continuity through a structured handover process. By contrast, Foad departed with no notice period, no permanent successor identified, and an immediate requirement for Sean Pilcher to step in as Interim Group Chief Risk Officer while a search commenced. The contrast between the two transitions raises obvious governance questions about what changed inside the bank between the Fletcher and Foad eras.

Police Reports

A critical question remains as to whether Mr. Bocresion was formally or informally apprised of the specific Police Reports generated in connection with the NatWest scandal. Allegations, including, but not limited to, attempted murder, coordinated attacks and surveillance of residents, insider trading, perverting the course of justice, the forgery of documentation, and misconduct in public office.

Insider Trading?

The regulatory significance lies in the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR). As Group Chief Risk Officer, Foad occupied one of the most important regulated positions within the organisation. Following his departure, NatWest was required to file a Form C (Notice of ceasing to perform a controlled function) with the Financial Conduct Authority within seven business days. The contents of that filing are not public, but the form requires disclosure relating to the departing executive’s fitness and propriety. The public FCA register records that Foad’s controlled function ended on 15 January 2026. The key question is not whether Foad left the bank, but whether the FCA and NatWest were provided with a complete picture of any material risk issues, escalations, complaints, or governance concerns that existed at the time of his departure. That question remains unanswered.

On 15 January 2026, NatWest announced that Keiran Foad had stepped down as Group Chief Risk Officer and had left the bank, with Sean Pilcher appointed as Interim CRO while a permanent successor was sought. That announcement did not land in a vacuum. Foad had already been informed that he was a key part of a forthcoming PropertyCorruption.com documentary feature, and that continued silence or procedural non-engagement would be recorded as part of the public evidential timeline. His departure also came one day after the draft six-month update of the case was issued. In that context, the timing was not merely a personnel change. It was a governance event.

Throughout 2025, unresolved and repeatedly documented risk concerns had been raised with NatWest. Foad, as Group Chief Risk Officer, sat at the centre of institutional escalation, oversight, and accountability, and was directly included in extensive correspondence over many months. The record shows selective engagement, prolonged silence, and no meaningful risk review despite the seriousness of the issues being raised. A complete handover pack existed covering everything connected to Foad’s involvement, including every email received, opened, read, or left unread. PropertyCorruption.com offered that pack to Interim CRO Sean Pilcher. He opened the email but did not respond. That is the point. NatWest placed an interim CRO into the role, was offered the evidential record, and still declined to engage. Risk exposure does not disappear because a senior executive leaves the building.

The most uncomfortable question is not whether NatWest executives ultimately sold shares under the August 2025 trading plans. The uncomfortable question is what they knew when those plans were created. On 29 August 2025, four of the bank’s most senior executives — including Group CEO Paul Thwaite, CFO Katie Murray, Retail CEO Solange Chamberlain, and Group CRO Keiran Foad — entered into irrevocable trading arrangements allowing future disposals of vested shares. The legal protection for such plans depends on a simple principle: they must be established when the executive is not in possession of material non-public information. NatWest had already been aware of the PropertyCorruption.com case study for 9 months, and the first court hearing connected to the dispute would follow on 3 November 2025. If evidence were ever to demonstrate that senior executives possessed knowledge of a material risk, governance failure, or emerging scandal that had not been disclosed to the market when those plans were established, the focus would immediately shift from the later share sales to the original decision to create the plans themselves.

This is why the departure of Keiran Foad matters. Foad was one of the executives who entered into the August 2025 arrangements and was also the executive most directly connected to the risk governance issues later highlighted by PropertyCorruption.com. He then left NatWest abruptly on 15 January 2026, one day after the six-month review of the case was circulated, with no permanent successor in place. The question for regulators is therefore straightforward: what information was available to NatWest’s most senior executives on 29 August 2025, what discussions took place before those plans were approved, and how did that information compare with what was disclosed to shareholders at the time? If the answer is that no material non-public information existed, the plans stand on ordinary regulatory foundations. If the answer is different, the August 2025 trading plans could become one of the most important pieces of evidence in understanding what NatWest’s leadership knew, when they knew it, and whether the market was given the same information.

Keiran Foad and Portugal

Keiran Foad is still in Portugal – we wonder if this career break will become a permanent relocation? See linkedin here.

Portugal’s updated post-2024 high value professional residency targets:

Executives, directors, or specialists with high-level management experience
People with significant salaries, stock compensation, or pension streams
Individuals who contribute to strategic economic activity (finance, tech, research, investment)

Keiran Foad:

Former CRO of NatWest Group
Years of senior banking experience
Likely has vested shares and multi-million-pound income streams
Could easily claim “high value professional” status

To claim tax residency, he needs to spend 183 days in the country or show an “intent to stay”. Will be interesting to see if he’s still there in August 2026.

Here are the 3 key ways his “Portugal Pivot” helps him hide from a potential investigation:

1. The “Jurisdictional Delay” (Service of Process)

In the UK, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) or a civil claimant can serve legal papers relatively easily. Once he is in Portugal, the complexity spikes:

The Hague Service Convention: Any formal “Service of Process” (the delivery of legal papers for a court case) must now go through the Foreign Process Section of the Royal Courts of Justice and the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The “Translate and Wait” Loop: Papers often need to be translated into Portuguese. Every step of this diplomatic “handover” can take weeks or months.

2. The “Right to Silence” Sanctuary

Portugal’s legal system (rooted in Civil Law) offers incredibly strong protections for the accused, particularly the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

3. The “Financial Exit” and Asset Shielding

By establishing himself as a “High Value Professional” in Portugal, he severs his primary financial link to the UK:

The 10-Year Tax Shield: Under the NHR 2.0 (IFICI) program, he can re-structure his wealth into Portuguese “Life Assurance Bonds” or offshore portfolios that are compliant with local law but “opaque” to standard UK forensic clawback attempts.
Clawback Resistance: If a UK court later orders a “Clawback” of his bonuses or shares , enforcing that judgment on assets held in a Portuguese tax-advantaged structure is a nightmare. Portuguese courts generally do not recognize “Punitive Damages,” only compensatory ones, meaning a UK “fine” might be legally unenforceable in Lisbon.

Evelyn Partners Acquisition

NatWest announced a new Group Chief Risk Officer during the regulatory approval window for its £2.7bn Evelyn Partners acquisition. That raises a legitimate question: was the appointment designed to reassure regulators and markets that the bank’s risk function was stable before completion, or did it avoid drawing attention to unresolved risk-governance questions that might complicate the deal?

Regulators

The most important regulatory event has not happened yet. NatWest announced that Abib Bocresion’s appointment is subject to regulatory approval, meaning the PRA and FCA must ultimately be satisfied that he is fit to perform one of the most important risk-management roles in the UK banking system. The question is not whether regulators approve experienced banking executives every day—they do. The question is whether the regulators responsible for approving the appointment have been provided with a complete picture of the governance environment Bocresion is inheriting. If significant unresolved issues, escalations, or ongoing reviews exist within NatWest’s risk function, the approval process becomes more than a routine administrative exercise. It becomes an opportunity to determine whether those issues have been properly identified, assessed, and addressed before responsibility for them is formally transferred to a new Chief Risk Officer.

The Government Review

The key question is – how long can the Government stall the Cabinet Office granted review into the NatWest Scandal? See here.

On 26 February 2026, Crown Commercial Service formally stated that it took procurement integrity and supplier conduct seriously, invited submission of evidence, and indicated a willingness to arrange meetings with relevant officials following a preliminary review. PropertyCorruption.com responded on 3 March, explaining that the evidential record ran to thousands of pages and requesting a discussion about scope, escalation routes, security concerns, accommodations, and process before submitting the first tranche of material. Weeks later, despite the stated seriousness of the allegations and repeated follow-up communications, no response had been provided.

That silence became increasingly difficult to explain as the timeline progressed. On 8 March, PropertyCorruption.com sent further correspondence to CCS and Brighton County Court seeking clarification regarding a court hearing listed on official systems. Neither recipient opened the email. Throughout the period, Rt Hon Nick Thomas-Symonds MP continued to receive updates regarding the allegations, the evidence, and the lack of engagement, yet no intervention was forthcoming. The issue is therefore no longer whether CCS initially took the matter seriously. The issue is whether a public commitment to review allegations was followed by meaningful action or quietly abandoned once engagement became inconvenient. If public bodies invite evidence, acknowledge receipt, and then cease engagement altogether, questions about accountability are not only legitimate—they become unavoidable.

For more information about the NatWest Scandal, see our former lead front page story below and also the document archive here.

Which Entities Will Be Most Impacted by the NatWest Scandal?

The NatWest Group Scandal (see full report here) can never be stopped. Why? Because the cover-up doesn’t rest on one smoking gun — it has four:

Could NatWest ever appoint another permanent Chief Risk Officer (see here)? Update: Abib Bocresion appointed as CRO starting July 2026.
The Government Cabinet Office granted a review into NatWest’s law firm, TLT LLP — then stopped opening emails.
Brighton County Court can’t correct the PCOL record without potentially uncovering serious wrongdoing.
Brighton Police refused to say which crime reports they were responding to.

Who is most exposed in the Scandal? We’d say these 10 entities:

TLT

TLT’s Disgraceful Letter and Our Response 7 May 2026

Further TLT and Court Misstatements 12 May 2026

Brighton Court:

Alleged Misconduct Involving Brighton County Court, TLT and NatWest Group 22 May 2026

Oakley Property

Coole Bevis:

Were Coole Bevis Misled or Are They Trying to Mislead? 21 Apr 2026

AXA:

Did AXA Just Try Yet Another Corruption Reset? 21 April 2026

Nationwide: