Updated 20 August 2026 (Oakley Property transcript, they slam down phone when Police mentioned)

Updated 13 September 2026: This week, readers of this article are mainly located (based on available statistics) in: London, Belfast, Seacroft, Little Common, Edinburgh, Bournemouth, Oxford and Manchester.

21 September 2026 Update – See train staff responding to allegations of a property whistleblower being targeted in a staged incident on train:Email propertycorruption@proton.me for access to video.

The NatWest Scandal

The diagram above illustrates how organisations in the NatWest Scandal may seek to obscure alleged attacks on residents, resident surveillance, and an expanding range of alleged criminal conduct by repeatedly reshaping the narrative. This may involve transferring debts between related entities and restructuring their organisations in ways that make responsibility more difficult to trace. It’s easy to see why entities like Oakley Property might be desperate to separate themselves from the Scandal, see more about their role here. (Update 20 August now includes transcript of call with them)

It also raises a broader question: if these practices affect one part of an organisation’s operations, could its wider portfolio also be compromised? More importantly, what further issues may remain undisclosed?

See the full story and links below:

Will Paul Thwaite’s Appointment of a New CRO Curb the NatWest Scandal?

Paul Thwaite NatWest Group CEO

When a Group Chief Risk Officer is appointed at a FTSE 100 bank, the decision is not made by one individual acting alone. The appointment passes through the highest levels of the organisation, involving the Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors, the Board Nominations Committee, senior governance functions, and ultimately the UK regulatory approval process. By the time any appointment is announced, the appointment would have already survived multiple layers of review and scrutiny.

NatWest announced the appointment of Abib Bocresion as its new Group Chief Risk Officer, with the appointment taking effect on 1 July 2026 subject to regulatory approval (UPDATE: was approved). Bocresion was not recruited from outside the organisation. Having joined NatWest Markets as Chief Risk Officer in April 2025, he already sat within the bank’s risk leadership structure, reporting to NatWest Markets CEO Jonathan Peberdy with an additional reporting line into then Group Chief Risk Officer Keiran Foad. As a result, his appointment is not merely the arrival of a new executive. It represents the transfer of responsibility for every unresolved risk, escalation, and governance question that survived the abrupt departure of his predecessor.

The central question is what, exactly, NatWest’s Board, senior leadership, and regulators believed they were handing to him. Was he given a stable and well-governed risk function, or did he inherit unresolved issues, unanswered escalations, and risks that had already been sitting within the organisation for months? We can’t help wondering whether the mess of the NatWest Scandal is rooted in CEO Paul Thwaite’s lack of experience for his role, from The Guardian:

Also, Bocresion cannot be presented as someone who arrived at NatWest Group Risk with no prior notice of the NatWest Scandal. On 8 February 2026, PropertyCorruption.com emailed him directly (see below) at NatWest, copying NatWest Markets CEO Jonathan Peberdy and other NatWest personnel, expressly stating that the site was conducting a deep-dive review of NatWest’s risk function, including NatWest Markets. The email linked to the mission page, the latest NatWest-related case study update, and the NatWest/TLT case study homepage. That email was opened, and the read receipt will be published with this article. This means that before Bocresion was announced as Group Chief Risk Officer, he had already been directly notified that NatWest’s risk governance was under public scrutiny. The issue is therefore not merely what he inherited on appointment, but what NatWest’s risk leadership had already been told before promoting him into the Group role.

Email sent

The context into which Abib Bocresion was promoted becomes more interesting when viewed against the departure of his predecessor, Keiran Foad. On 15 January 2026, Foad stepped down as NatWest’s Group Chief Risk Officer and left the bank immediately (the day after the draft version of this article was sent to Mr Foad and NatWest). NatWest described the move as a routine departure, but the mechanics differed sharply from the bank’s previous CRO transition. When former CRO Bruce Fletcher retired, NatWest announced the change on 1 December 2022, named Foad as successor in the same announcement, provided roughly six months’ notice, and maintained continuity through a structured handover process. By contrast, Foad departed with no notice period, no permanent successor identified, and an immediate requirement for Sean Pilcher to step in as Interim Group Chief Risk Officer while a search commenced. The contrast between the two transitions raises obvious governance questions about what changed inside the bank between the Fletcher and Foad eras.

Police Reports

A critical question remains as to whether Mr. Bocresion was formally or informally apprised of the specific Police Reports generated in connection with the NatWest scandal. Allegations, including, but not limited to, attempted murder, coordinated attacks and surveillance of residents, insider trading, perverting the course of justice, the forgery of documentation, and misconduct in public office.

Insider Trading?

The regulatory significance lies in the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR). As Group Chief Risk Officer, Foad occupied one of the most important regulated positions within the organisation. Following his departure, NatWest was required to file a Form C (Notice of ceasing to perform a controlled function) with the Financial Conduct Authority within seven business days. The contents of that filing are not public, but the form requires disclosure relating to the departing executive’s fitness and propriety. The public FCA register records that Foad’s controlled function ended on 15 January 2026. The key question is not whether Foad left the bank, but whether the FCA and NatWest were provided with a complete picture of any material risk issues, escalations, complaints, or governance concerns that existed at the time of his departure. That question remains unanswered.

On 15 January 2026, NatWest announced that Keiran Foad had stepped down as Group Chief Risk Officer and had left the bank, with Sean Pilcher appointed as Interim CRO while a permanent successor was sought. That announcement did not land in a vacuum. Foad had already been informed that he was a key part of a forthcoming PropertyCorruption.com documentary feature, and that continued silence or procedural non-engagement would be recorded as part of the public evidential timeline. His departure also came one day after the draft six-month update of the case was issued. In that context, the timing was not merely a personnel change. It was a governance event.

Throughout 2025, unresolved and repeatedly documented risk concerns had been raised with NatWest. Foad, as Group Chief Risk Officer, sat at the centre of institutional escalation, oversight, and accountability, and was directly included in extensive correspondence over many months. The record shows selective engagement, prolonged silence, and no meaningful risk review despite the seriousness of the issues being raised. A complete handover pack existed covering everything connected to Foad’s involvement, including every email received, opened, read, or left unread. PropertyCorruption.com offered that pack to Interim CRO Sean Pilcher. He opened the email but did not respond. That is the point. NatWest placed an interim CRO into the role, was offered the evidential record, and still declined to engage. Risk exposure does not disappear because a senior executive leaves the building.

The most uncomfortable question is not whether NatWest executives ultimately sold shares under the August 2025 trading plans. The uncomfortable question is what they knew when those plans were created. On 29 August 2025, four of the bank’s most senior executives — including Group CEO Paul Thwaite, CFO Katie Murray, Retail CEO Solange Chamberlain, and Group CRO Keiran Foad — entered into irrevocable trading arrangements allowing future disposals of vested shares. The legal protection for such plans depends on a simple principle: they must be established when the executive is not in possession of material non-public information. NatWest had already been aware of the PropertyCorruption.com case study for 9 months, and the first court hearing connected to the dispute would follow on 3 November 2025. If evidence were ever to demonstrate that senior executives possessed knowledge of a material risk, governance failure, or emerging scandal that had not been disclosed to the market when those plans were established, the focus would immediately shift from the later share sales to the original decision to create the plans themselves.

This is why the departure of Keiran Foad matters. Foad was one of the executives who entered into the August 2025 arrangements and was also the executive most directly connected to the risk governance issues later highlighted by PropertyCorruption.com. He then left NatWest abruptly on 15 January 2026, one day after the six-month review of the case was circulated, with no permanent successor in place. The question for regulators is therefore straightforward: what information was available to NatWest’s most senior executives on 29 August 2025, what discussions took place before those plans were approved, and how did that information compare with what was disclosed to shareholders at the time? If the answer is that no material non-public information existed, the plans stand on ordinary regulatory foundations. If the answer is different, the August 2025 trading plans could become one of the most important pieces of evidence in understanding what NatWest’s leadership knew, when they knew it, and whether the market was given the same information.

Keiran Foad and Portugal

Keiran Foad is still in Portugal – we wonder if this career break will become a permanent relocation? See linkedin here.

Portugal’s updated post-2024 high value professional residency targets:

• Executives, directors, or specialists with high-level management experience
• People with significant salaries, stock compensation, or pension streams
• Individuals who contribute to strategic economic activity (finance, tech, research, investment)

Keiran Foad:

• Former CRO of NatWest Group
• Years of senior banking experience
• Likely has vested shares and multi-million-pound income streams
• Could easily claim “high value professional” status

To claim tax residency, he needs to spend 183 days in the country or show an “intent to stay”. Will be interesting to see if he’s still there in August 2026.

Here are the 3 key ways his “Portugal Pivot” helps him hide from a potential investigation:

1. The “Jurisdictional Delay” (Service of Process)

In the UK, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) or a civil claimant can serve legal papers relatively easily. Once he is in Portugal, the complexity spikes:

• The Hague Service Convention: Any formal “Service of Process” (the delivery of legal papers for a court case) must now go through the Foreign Process Section of the Royal Courts of Justice and the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• The “Translate and Wait” Loop: Papers often need to be translated into Portuguese. Every step of this diplomatic “handover” can take weeks or months.

2. The “Right to Silence” Sanctuary

Portugal’s legal system (rooted in Civil Law) offers incredibly strong protections for the accused, particularly the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

3. The “Financial Exit” and Asset Shielding

By establishing himself as a “High Value Professional” in Portugal, he severs his primary financial link to the UK:

• The 10-Year Tax Shield: Under the NHR 2.0 (IFICI) program, he can re-structure his wealth into Portuguese “Life Assurance Bonds” or offshore portfolios that are compliant with local law but “opaque” to standard UK forensic clawback attempts.
• Clawback Resistance: If a UK court later orders a “Clawback” of his bonuses or shares , enforcing that judgment on assets held in a Portuguese tax-advantaged structure can be challenging.

Regulators

The most important regulatory event has not happened yet. NatWest announced that Abib Bocresion’s appointment is subject to regulatory approval, meaning the PRA and FCA must ultimately be satisfied that he is fit to perform one of the most important risk-management roles in the UK banking system. The question is not whether regulators approve experienced banking executives every day—they do. The question is whether the regulators responsible for approving the appointment have been provided with a complete picture of the governance environment Bocresion is inheriting. If significant unresolved issues, escalations, or ongoing reviews exist within NatWest’s risk function, the approval process becomes more than a routine administrative exercise. It becomes an opportunity to determine whether those issues have been properly identified, assessed, and addressed before responsibility for them is formally transferred to a new Chief Risk Officer.

The Government Review

The key question is – how long can the Government stall the Cabinet Office granted review into the NatWest Scandal? See here.

On 26 February 2026, Crown Commercial Service formally stated that it took procurement integrity and supplier conduct seriously, invited submission of evidence, and indicated a willingness to arrange meetings with relevant officials following a preliminary review. PropertyCorruption.com responded on 3 March, explaining that the evidential record ran to thousands of pages and requesting a discussion about scope, escalation routes, security concerns, accommodations, and process before submitting the first tranche of material. Weeks later, despite the stated seriousness of the allegations and repeated follow-up communications, no response had been provided.

That silence became increasingly difficult to explain as the timeline progressed. On 8 March, PropertyCorruption.com sent further correspondence to CCS and Brighton County Court seeking clarification regarding a court hearing listed on official systems. Neither recipient opened the email. Throughout the period, Rt Hon Nick Thomas-Symonds MP continued to receive updates regarding the allegations, the evidence, and the lack of engagement, yet no intervention was forthcoming. The issue is therefore no longer whether CCS initially took the matter seriously. The issue is whether a public commitment to review allegations was followed by meaningful action or quietly abandoned once engagement became inconvenient. If public bodies invite evidence, acknowledge receipt, and then cease engagement altogether, questions about accountability are not only legitimate—they become unavoidable.

For more information about the NatWest Scandal, see our former lead front page story below and also the document archive here.

Which Entities Will Be Most Impacted by the NatWest Scandal?

The NatWest Group Scandal (see full report here) can never be stopped. Why? Because the cover-up doesn’t rest on one smoking gun — it has four:

1. Could NatWest ever appoint another permanent Chief Risk Officer (see here)? Update: Abib Bocresion appointed as CRO starting July 2026.
2. The Government Cabinet Office granted a review into NatWest’s law firm, TLT LLP — then stopped opening emails.
3. Brighton County Court can’t correct the PCOL record without potentially uncovering serious wrongdoing.
4. Brighton Police refused to say which crime reports they were responding to.

Who is most exposed in the Scandal? We’d say these 10 entities:

TLT

TLT’s Disgraceful Letter and Our Response

Further TLT and Court Misstatements

Brighton Court:

Alleged Misconduct Involving Brighton County Court, TLT and NatWest Group

Oakley Property

Coole Bevis / Dean Wilson (new Update on 18 August 2026)

Were Coole Bevis Misled or Are They Trying to Mislead?

AXA:

Did AXA Just Try Yet Another Corruption Reset?

Nationwide:

Why Dame Crosbie should Lose Her Title and Ministers Be Sacked

Apax:

Does Bharet Patel of Apax have a conflict of interest?

Aston Vaughan

Everest Miles Contractors:

David Vaughan of Aston Vaughan: “That’s your problem”

Winkworth:

2025 emails ignored by Winkworth who continued marketing properties

Update 23 June 2026

The corrupt techniques employed across these entities are shockingly similar. For example, When the Cabinet Office orders a review into TLT LLP, the subsequent emails are ignored. Police reports are met with replies that refuse to specify which reports they are addressing. Brighton Court has ceased opening correspondence regarding shadow hearings, while just this week PCOL helpdesk feigns ignorance of the context then stops opening emails entirely.

Has perverting the course of justice and misconduct in public office become the standard playbook? While court customer investigations may still be opening emails, meaningful action remains unlikely. The PCOL helpdesk operates under the HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS), led by CEO Nick Goodwin (see above). Notably, PCOL Helpdesk avoid providing reference numbers or the surnames of those responding—a clear tactic to facilitate evasion and shield those involved from accountability?

Nick Goodwin has been informed of the broader scandal since May 2026:

June 24 Update

From Finimize Newsroom:

What they neglect to mention about Berenburg: The German financial regulator, BaFin, suspended Berenberg Bank’s executive board—including former CEO/Managing Partner Hendrik Riehmer and David Mortlock—over potential corporate governance breaches. As a result, former CEO Dr. Hans-Walter Peters and Michael Horf were appointed as special commissioners to assume responsibility for the bank’s management.

Berenburg and NatWest seem well aligned.

Update 6 July 2026

Quilter appears to have joined the corruption scandal by seeming to refuse to give details of their call operators who provided information that was false in a matter linked to the broader situation.

Concerns remain regarding how Quilter’s leadership, including CEO Steven Levin, is handling the facts related to the active Police Reports, the Cabinet Office-authorized review, and the extensive documentary evidence.

Update: Quilter has recently transitioned to password-protected emails. While their representative, Alana, has initiated contact, our outstanding questions remain unaddressed. This raises broader concerns about their standard dispute resolution procedures and how such practices might impact vulnerable clients.

Furthermore, Katie Street from their complaints department contacted us by phone. We explicitly requested that all future communications be conducted via email to ensure full transparency.

Update – 8 July 2026: Despite our clear instruction for email-only communication, Quilter continues to attempt phone contact.

Update – 8 July 2026 – Quilter replied but quickly closed the issue as a standard complaint while admitting to providing false information. What is still missing:

Outstanding Requirements from Quilter

• The Full Identities of the Handlers: The full names of “Natalie” and the unnamed handler from the July 3rd call.
  • Context for Refusal: Your refusal to provide these names under the guise of internal privacy policies is a material block. These names are not being requested for a routine customer service review; they are explicitly required to populate active Police Reports.
  • State-Level Relevance: Furthermore, these identities are directly relevant to an ongoing Cabinet Office review into structural corruption, as well as a live second contact established this week with MI5 regarding serious, overlapping systemic issues. Withholding these names directly prevents the complete mapping of actors involved in these broader state-level inquiries.
• Acknowledgment of the Broader Context (The Omission): A written explanation as to why your summary of my complaint completely omitted the broader context I provided in the article links and the website context (including the active NatWest scandal detailed in this article).
  • The Motive for Omission: I believe this broader context was deliberately excluded from your summary because acknowledging it would make it obvious that it is entirely inappropriate to deal with this situation at your current internal level. By shrinking the scope of the complaint and ignoring the structural evidence provided, you are attempting to quickly close this file and push it toward the Financial Ombudsman Service/Pensions Ombudsman, knowing they are not equipped to handle systemic, multi-sector corporate corruption.
• The Scripting and Process Origins: Confirmation of whether the incorrect information provided on the July 3rd call was the handler acting entirely independently, or if they were reading from a standard Quilter internal macro or procedural script designed to introduce administrative friction.
• Executive Acknowledgment: Confirmation that Steven Levin (CEO) and the broader Executive Committee have been fully briefed on the fact that Quilter’s internal communications are now part of a broader, multi-agency intelligence and police dossier regarding corporate structural capture. We also note a significant uptick in website traffic from Luxembourg today which could be an indication of serious escalation within Quilter and beyond.
• The full process is still has been withheld, so Quilter appears to still be actively trying to obscure and deceive: “Once completed, the relevant withdrawal documentation will be issued to you, and any further requirements will be outlined on the withdrawal form at that stage.” There is no reason why should be the case. A full explanation of this is required – isn’t it a standard process? If not, why not? Provide the relevant process documentation to explain the process. It’s staggering that Quilter is still engaging in these tactics.That Quilter admits to giving false information but then still doesn’t give the full process is staggering.
• It is time for Quilter’s Non-Executive Directors (see below) to step in with their impartial view and execute their core regulatory responsibilities. Rather than allowing the executive committee to barricade itself behind administrative friction, the NEDs must actively challenge management, ensure the strict integrity of the firm’s risk and control frameworks, and hold CEO Steven Levin, Chair Ruth Markland, CFO Mark Satchel directly accountable for the legal and reputational exposure generated by this strategy of wilful blindness. If they choose to look the other way, they cease to be independent overseers and become active participants in the governance failure.

It’s our guess that Dominic Harris the Pensions Ombudsman and the Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman wouldn’t see this case as urgent:

Update 7 July 2026

Harassment of property-corruption whistleblowers in train stations and rail networks

Concerns about the harassment of property-corruption whistleblowers across train stations and rail networks have now escalated to serious reports alleging active staff involvement in improper surveillance.

Will Network Rail CEO Jeremy Westlake request further information and ensure these allegations are independently examined, or will the organisation attempt to bury the issue?

They previously ignored our emails:

Update 30 July 2026 – National rail completely ignores further emails and the the inclusion in this article. Karen Stapleton General Counsel (National) at Network Rail has been added to legal priority investigation page, see here.

Update 7 Aug 2026 – Harassment and tracking continues, has Lucy D’Orsi (Chief Constable of Transport Police) being informed by National Rail?

Update 9 July 2026

Wilful Blindness of Systemic Corruption May Be the Biggest Crime

Systemic corruption rarely looks like a dramatic conspiracy; more often, it takes the form of a coordinated, institutional shrug where professionals simply choose to look the other way. A clear pattern emerges when observing how various supposedly independent bodies handle blatant anomalies.

The issues begin at the most basic levels of accountability. Police pretend that failing to specify which exact crime report they are referring to simply does not matter, stripping transparency from the investigative process.

Simultaneously, the legal infrastructure turns a blind eye to fundamental flaws. Brighton Court actively ignores that Possession Claims Online (PCOL) documentation is completely wrong, while the courts’ own PCOL IT administrators refuse to perform basic functions like resetting passwords, effectively blocking access to the system entirely.

This unified front of apathy extends deep into the property and legal sectors. Oakley Property ignores the reality that service charges have not been successfully chased for 21 months, operating alongside a fabricated service charge history. Furthermore, legal firms like Coole Bevis and Dean Wilson pretend that abruptly abandoning service charge collections against a backdrop of serious allegations is an entirely routine practice.

In the financial realm, the behavior is remarkably similar. Quilter employees lie about internal procedures, refuse to outline the full process, and unilaterally close complaints to bury the issue. Meanwhile, TLT and NatWest engage in a host of lies and omissions that further obscure the truth.

The list goes on, but the overarching theme remains identical across every institution. They are all doing the exact same thing by actively ignoring the corruption all around them, operating as if systemic corruption does not exist.

This creates a protective ring of wilful blindness where no single entity has to take responsibility as long as everyone agrees to feign ignorance. When the institutions designed to uphold the law and manage civil society weaponize bureaucracy to protect corrupt practices, it forces a devastating question. How many lives does this destroy on a daily basis we wonder?

Update June 9th 2026

Quilter’s calculated attempt to downgrade multi-agency corruption into a routine customer complaint is rapidly crossing the line from institutional evasion to the active obstruction of justice. By deliberately withholding the identities of call operators who provided false information, and by hiding the procedural scripts that dictate these denials, Quilter is weaponizing administrative opacity to shield bad actors and stall active criminal investigations. We formally demand that Quilter CEO Steven Levin immediately release the unredacted identities of “Natalie” and the July 3rd handler—information explicitly required for live Police Reports—alongside the complete, unedited internal process documentation they are hiding behind. Silence in the face of state-level inquiries is no longer compliance; it is a cover-up.

When a scandal of this magnitude engulfs an institution like NatWest Group, the potential fallout on the UK’s financial and institutional integrity is immense. This is not a localized issue; it involves the parent company of Coutts, the private bank that serves the Royal Household. With MI5 having been contacted multiple times regarding overlapping systemic issues, foreign interference, and the collaboration of these elements with bad domestic actors, the stakes have rapidly escalated beyond corporate negligence. In a situation commanding such profound international interest and national security implications, the importance of Quilter identifying the specific individuals orchestrating these cover-ups cannot be understated. In fact, when institutions weaponize anonymity to stall multi-agency and state-level inquiries, exposing the individual actors pulling the strings becomes an absolute necessity to protect the nation’s core infrastructure.

As the Group Chief Risk Officer appointed in March 2026, Margaret Ammon (see above) is explicitly tasked with the strategic development of Quilter’s risk framework. Upon her appointment, CEO Steven Levin publicly stated that her expertise would “ensure we continue to operate with resilience and integrity”. The severe allegations of structural capture, potential foreign interference, and multi-sector corporate corruption detailed in our active Police Reports fall unequivocally under this broad remit of enterprise risk and financial crime oversight. While Quilter’s corporate values proudly claim that they “Do the right thing” and “act with integrity”, the executive team’s silence points to a deliberate shielding of potentially compromised internal actors. If Quilter’s internal security and risk apparatus actually functioned as advertised, Ammon and her team should have immediately escalated these multi-agency state-level inquiries both internally to the Board and externally to the appropriate regulatory bodies. By withholding the identities of those involved in the cover-up and ignoring the broader NatWest and intelligence links, Quilter is not operating with resilience; they are actively burying systemic risk.

Update 9 July 2026 – Part Two

Quilter has responded:

• Bill Haines’ Administrative Shut-Down: The Head of Complaints has attempted to close the matter by stating Quilter has “no further comments to add” and explicitly declaring, “we will not enter into any further correspondence regarding this complaint.”
• The Unilateral Information Black Hole: Bill Haines openly confirms a corporate policy of institutional evasion, stating that any future evidence or updates sent to the firm “will be retained on file without response” in a direct effort to stop generating a discoverable paper trail.
• Executive Firewalling: By deploying a “final response” template from the Head of Complaints, Quilter is using administrative personnel to shield senior executive risk owners and board members from their personal regulatory duties.
• The Quilter doctrine is staggering: having been forced to admit they provided false information, their immediate response is to refuse all further communication. In effect, their position is that because they were caught lying, they now have the right to enforce a total blackout. We have other potential lies to discuss but evidently that’s not allowed.

The Lloyds Connection

With City analysts actively pushing Lloyds Banking Group toward a theoretical £3.1 billion acquisition of Quilter to expand its wealth footprint, Quilter’s executive board is under immense pressure to maintain a spotless, frictionless compliance profile. If Lloyds’ risk apparatus proceeds with due diligence without factoring in this documented, structural cover-up described above, they are not acquiring a clean, mass-affluent asset; they are blindly absorbing a multi-agency regulatory contagion.

Further Links

Want to learn more about the Scandal? You might be interested in the impact on:

Oakley Property

The Beginning of the End for Oakley Property? 12 June 2026

Keiran Foad

 A Question of Transparency: The NatWest Scandal and Portugal’s Residency Dilemma 24 June 2026

The Education Sector

Bridget Phillipson and the NatWest Scandal 6 July 2026

Update 25 July 2026

One of the entities connected to the NatWest Scandal has retained Headland Consultancy to manage its communications response.

We do not correspond through external PR agencies. If the entity concerned wishes to engage directly and substantively with the issues we have raised, rather than attempting to reset the narrative through communications sent across three separate email addresses which pretend zero prior knowledge (a common tactic), we remain willing to speak with them.

We intend to record Headland’s involvement in the latest police report and in the material submitted for the live government review, including concerns about the tactics being used. We will also begin a broader review of Headland Consultancy (investigation page is here – password protected) and its role with other clients. As Lloyds Bank appears to fund Headland, we will also add it to our banking workstream here.

From their website:

Dan Mines, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) – Headland

Headland clients include Pret A Manger, Matalan, Carlsberg Britvic, Diageo, Premier Foods, Airbnb, PayPal, LinkedIn and Darktrace.

Should Headland not have an escalation process for cases involving police reports, government scrutiny and allegations as serious as attempted murder etc? A firm that claims to handle crises with “discretion and integrity” should assess whether an engagement is ethically appropriate, not simply manage the client’s reputation.

Update 31 July 2026

The appointment of a senior LSEG executive to a leadership role at NatWest (see here) raises legitimate concerns about the “revolving door” between major financial institutions and organisations involved in operating and overseeing UK markets. NatWest is listed on the London Stock Exchange, while LSEG owns the Exchange and provides market infrastructure, data and technology services. Although there is no evidence from the appointment alone that the executive was involved in regulatory decisions, market surveillance or any investigation concerning NatWest, such moves can create a perceived conflict of interest and weaken public confidence in the independence of market oversight.

Update 16 August 2026

After accepting emails for the last year, the Bank of England has now blocked us.

Andrew John Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England above. His own words in a speech in February 2026:

“Regulation should always be defined in terms of a positive purpose. In other words, we want to achieve an objective and regulation should help to do that. We should then design the precise regulatory regime that achieves this positive objective as quickly and effectively as possible whilst minimising any undesirable side effects.”

The objective of regulation is to stop corruption like the NatWest Scandal – we wonder whether he sees this as positive or negative?