26 September 2026

The High Court has been on notice regarding both active litigation and pre-action claims linked to the NatWest scandal since November 2025, having received and opened multiple relevant communications:

…but by Feb 2026 when informed of the allegations of Brighton Court faking hearing records they stopped:

Now with a larger claim moving to High Court filing with these defendants:

National Westminster Bank Public Limited Company
OCH RTM Company Limited
Each RTM Director.
Oakley Property (Sussex) Limited

Before filing the expanded High Court claim, we intend to send the Court this article and ask a simple question: did it already know about this case and the matters documented here? If it says yes, that is relevant. If it says no, that can be tested against the record. If it refuses to answer, that refusal becomes part of the history.

That matters because the High Court is also the gatekeeper for any leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court. A direct appeal cannot proceed unless the High Court first grants the required certificate. If the High Court has already stopped engaging with material concerning this case, and now refuses even to clarify its prior knowledge, there is an obvious concern about relying on that same institution to open the direct route to Supreme Court scrutiny.

This creates an obvious Catch-22. The scale of the alleged NatWest scandal, the number of parties now involved and, most importantly, the High Court’s own prior knowledge and handling of the wider matter arguably make eventual Supreme Court scrutiny increasingly important. Yet the direct route to the Supreme Court can only be opened if the High Court itself first grants a leapfrog certificate. If the High Court will not even acknowledge what it previously knew, or explain why engagement with the matter apparently stopped, it raises an unavoidable question: will the same institution later refuse to open the very route by which its own handling could receive scrutiny at the highest level? The High Court cannot block Supreme Court consideration forever because the ordinary Court of Appeal route remains available, but it can block the direct route — which is precisely why this potential Catch-22 needs to be confronted now.

The NatWest Nexus and Government Paralysis

At the absolute centre of this structural collapse sit NatWest Group and its law firm, TLT LLP. The Cabinet Office initiated a review into TLT corruption, against the backdrop of Keiran Foad, NatWest’s former Group Chief Risk Officer, who abruptly departed the bank and appears to have relocated to the jurisdictional safety of Portugal.

But the most glaring admission of guilt is not what the institutions did next—it is what the UK Government stopped doing. The Government effectively halted its own corruption review by simply refusing to open emails.

Why would the machinery of the state blind itself to its own investigation? The answer lies in the deeply embedded nature of TLT LLP within government procurement and legal frameworks. The government is stuck in a devastating double bind: investigating the NatWest and TLT scandal to its natural conclusion would inevitably unearth a labyrinth of further state-level scandals.

The Intelligence Blockade: MI5 and Foreign Leverage

As the NatWest Scandal spirals, sweeping up an ever-expanding portfolio of entities, the exposure has escalated from corporate fraud to national security.

Extensive evidence has been sent to MI5 on multiple occasions, explicitly detailing how hostile states—are monitoring and exploiting this glaring institutional corruption to advance their own geopolitical aims.

Yet, MI5 finds its hands tied. The intelligence services cannot unravel the NatWest Scandal without simultaneously compromising the UK Government and exposing the depth of domestic institutional capture. The state’s refusal to clean its own house creates a profound vulnerability. Hostile states do not need to hack the UK’s legal and financial infrastructure; they simply have to leverage the fact that the UK Government is actively covering up its own rot.

The Hypocrisy of UK Foreign Policy

This domestic paralysis completely shatters the credibility of the UK’s foreign policy posture.

On the global stage, the UK projects moral authority, heavily backing its allies and condemning authoritarian regimes. Yet, domestically, it is actively running interference for systemic corruption, effectively handing leverage to the exact same hostile powers that it claims to be countering. A state cannot project strength abroad while its internal regulatory and legal mechanisms are held hostage by the fear of their own exposure.

A Deteriorating Reality

There is no elegant exit strategy for any party involved. The cover-up has expanded too far, the actors are too deeply entrenched, and the foreign leverage is already in play. By choosing willful blindness over accountability, the UK’s institutions have elevated a corporate governance scandal into a crisis of national security. The longer the silence continues, the more powerful that foreign leverage becomes.

Want to understand more about the NatWest Scandal? See the latest update below:

The NatWest Scandal: Exposing Portfolio-Wide Risk Across a Network of Entities

Updated 20 August 2026

The diagram above illustrates how organisations in the NatWest Scandal may seek to obscure alleged attacks on residents, resident surveillance, and an expanding range of alleged criminal conduct by repeatedly reshaping the narrative. This may involve transferring debts between related entities and restructuring their organisations in ways that make responsibility more difficult to trace. It’s easy to see why entities like Oakley Property might be desperate to separate themselves from the Scandal, see more about their role here. (Update now includes transcript of call with them)

It also raises a broader question: if these practices affect one part of an organisation’s operations, could its wider portfolio also be compromised? More importantly, what further issues may remain undisclosed?

See the full story and links below:

Will Paul Thwaite’s Appointment of a New CRO Curb the NatWest Scandal?

Paul Thwaite NatWest Group CEO

When a Group Chief Risk Officer is appointed at a FTSE 100 bank, the decision is not made by one individual acting alone. The appointment passes through the highest levels of the organisation, involving the Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors, the Board Nominations Committee, senior governance functions, and ultimately the UK regulatory approval process. By the time any appointment is announced, the appointment would have already survived multiple layers of review and scrutiny.

NatWest announced the appointment of Abib Bocresion as its new Group Chief Risk Officer, with the appointment taking effect on 1 July 2026 subject to regulatory approval (UPDATE: was approved). Bocresion was not recruited from outside the organisation. Having joined NatWest Markets as Chief Risk Officer in April 2025, he already sat within the bank’s risk leadership structure, reporting to NatWest Markets CEO Jonathan Peberdy with an additional reporting line into then Group Chief Risk Officer Keiran Foad. As a result, his appointment is not merely the arrival of a new executive. It represents the transfer of responsibility for every unresolved risk, escalation, and governance question that survived the abrupt departure of his predecessor.

The central question is what, exactly, NatWest’s Board, senior leadership, and regulators believed they were handing to him. Was he given a stable and well-governed risk function, or did he inherit unresolved issues, unanswered escalations, and risks that had already been sitting within the organisation for months? We can’t help wondering whether the mess of the NatWest Scandal is rooted in CEO Paul Thwaite’s lack of experience for his role, from The Guardian:

Also, Bocresion cannot be presented as someone who arrived at NatWest Group Risk with no prior notice of the NatWest Scandal. On 8 February 2026, PropertyCorruption.com emailed him directly (see below) at NatWest, copying NatWest Markets CEO Jonathan Peberdy and other NatWest personnel, expressly stating that the site was conducting a deep-dive review of NatWest’s risk function, including NatWest Markets. The email linked to the mission page, the latest NatWest-related case study update, and the NatWest/TLT case study homepage. That email was opened, and the read receipt will be published with this article. This means that before Bocresion was announced as Group Chief Risk Officer, he had already been directly notified that NatWest’s risk governance was under public scrutiny. The issue is therefore not merely what he inherited on appointment, but what NatWest’s risk leadership had already been told before promoting him into the Group role.

Email sent

The context into which Abib Bocresion was promoted becomes more interesting when viewed against the departure of his predecessor, Keiran Foad. On 15 January 2026, Foad stepped down as NatWest’s Group Chief Risk Officer and left the bank immediately (the day after the draft version of this article was sent to Mr Foad and NatWest). NatWest described the move as a routine departure, but the mechanics differed sharply from the bank’s previous CRO transition. When former CRO Bruce Fletcher retired, NatWest announced the change on 1 December 2022, named Foad as successor in the same announcement, provided roughly six months’ notice, and maintained continuity through a structured handover process. By contrast, Foad departed with no notice period, no permanent successor identified, and an immediate requirement for Sean Pilcher to step in as Interim Group Chief Risk Officer while a search commenced. The contrast between the two transitions raises obvious governance questions about what changed inside the bank between the Fletcher and Foad eras.

Police Reports

A critical question remains as to whether Mr. Bocresion was formally or informally apprised of the specific Police Reports generated in connection with the NatWest scandal. Allegations, including, but not limited to, attempted murder, coordinated attacks and surveillance of residents, insider trading, perverting the course of justice, the forgery of documentation, and misconduct in public office.

Insider Trading?

The regulatory significance lies in the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR). As Group Chief Risk Officer, Foad occupied one of the most important regulated positions within the organisation. Following his departure, NatWest was required to file a Form C (Notice of ceasing to perform a controlled function) with the Financial Conduct Authority within seven business days. The contents of that filing are not public, but the form requires disclosure relating to the departing executive’s fitness and propriety. The public FCA register records that Foad’s controlled function ended on 15 January 2026. The key question is not whether Foad left the bank, but whether the FCA and NatWest were provided with a complete picture of any material risk issues, escalations, complaints, or governance concerns that existed at the time of his departure. That question remains unanswered.

On 15 January 2026, NatWest announced that Keiran Foad had stepped down as Group Chief Risk Officer and had left the bank, with Sean Pilcher appointed as Interim CRO while a permanent successor was sought. That announcement did not land in a vacuum. Foad had already been informed that he was a key part of a forthcoming PropertyCorruption.com documentary feature, and that continued silence or procedural non-engagement would be recorded as part of the public evidential timeline. His departure also came one day after the draft six-month update of the case was issued. In that context, the timing was not merely a personnel change. It was a governance event.

Throughout 2025, unresolved and repeatedly documented risk concerns had been raised with NatWest. Foad, as Group Chief Risk Officer, sat at the centre of institutional escalation, oversight, and accountability, and was directly included in extensive correspondence over many months. The record shows selective engagement, prolonged silence, and no meaningful risk review despite the seriousness of the issues being raised. A complete handover pack existed covering everything connected to Foad’s involvement, including every email received, opened, read, or left unread. PropertyCorruption.com offered that pack to Interim CRO Sean Pilcher. He opened the email but did not respond. That is the point. NatWest placed an interim CRO into the role, was offered the evidential record, and still declined to engage. Risk exposure does not disappear because a senior executive leaves the building.

The most uncomfortable question is not whether NatWest executives ultimately sold shares under the August 2025 trading plans. The uncomfortable question is what they knew when those plans were created. On 29 August 2025, four of the bank’s most senior executives — including Group CEO Paul Thwaite, CFO Katie Murray, Retail CEO Solange Chamberlain, and Group CRO Keiran Foad — entered into irrevocable trading arrangements allowing future disposals of vested shares. The legal protection for such plans depends on a simple principle: they must be established when the executive is not in possession of material non-public information. NatWest had already been aware of the PropertyCorruption.com case study for 9 months, and the first court hearing connected to the dispute would follow on 3 November 2025. If evidence were ever to demonstrate that senior executives possessed knowledge of a material risk, governance failure, or emerging scandal that had not been disclosed to the market when those plans were established, the focus would immediately shift from the later share sales to the original decision to create the plans themselves.

This is why the departure of Keiran Foad matters. Foad was one of the executives who entered into the August 2025 arrangements and was also the executive most directly connected to the risk governance issues later highlighted by PropertyCorruption.com. He then left NatWest abruptly on 15 January 2026, one day after the six-month review of the case was circulated, with no permanent successor in place. The question for regulators is therefore straightforward: what information was available to NatWest’s most senior executives on 29 August 2025, what discussions took place before those plans were approved, and how did that information compare with what was disclosed to shareholders at the time? If the answer is that no material non-public information existed, the plans stand on ordinary regulatory foundations. If the answer is different, the August 2025 trading plans could become one of the most important pieces of evidence in understanding what NatWest’s leadership knew, when they knew it, and whether the market was given the same information.

Keiran Foad and Portugal

Keiran Foad is still in Portugal – we wonder if this career break will become a permanent relocation? See linkedin here.

Portugal’s updated post-2024 high value professional residency targets:

Executives, directors, or specialists with high-level management experience
People with significant salaries, stock compensation, or pension streams
Individuals who contribute to strategic economic activity (finance, tech, research, investment)

Keiran Foad:

Former CRO of NatWest Group
Years of senior banking experience
Likely has vested shares and multi-million-pound income streams
Could easily claim “high value professional” status

To claim tax residency, he needs to spend 183 days in the country or show an “intent to stay”. Will be interesting to see if he’s still there in August 2026.

Here are the 3 key ways his “Portugal Pivot” helps him hide from a potential investigation:

1. The “Jurisdictional Delay” (Service of Process)

In the UK, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) or a civil claimant can serve legal papers relatively easily. Once he is in Portugal, the complexity spikes:

The Hague Service Convention: Any formal “Service of Process” (the delivery of legal papers for a court case) must now go through the Foreign Process Section of the Royal Courts of Justice and the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The “Translate and Wait” Loop: Papers often need to be translated into Portuguese. Every step of this diplomatic “handover” can take weeks or months.

2. The “Right to Silence” Sanctuary

Portugal’s legal system (rooted in Civil Law) offers incredibly strong protections for the accused, particularly the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

3. The “Financial Exit” and Asset Shielding

By establishing himself as a “High Value Professional” in Portugal, he severs his primary financial link to the UK:

The 10-Year Tax Shield: Under the NHR 2.0 (IFICI) program, he can re-structure his wealth into Portuguese “Life Assurance Bonds” or offshore portfolios that are compliant with local law but “opaque” to standard UK forensic clawback attempts.
Clawback Resistance: If a UK court later orders a “Clawback” of his bonuses or shares , enforcing that judgment on assets held in a Portuguese tax-advantaged structure can be challenging..

Regulators

The most important regulatory event has not happened yet. NatWest announced that Abib Bocresion’s appointment is subject to regulatory approval, meaning the PRA and FCA must ultimately be satisfied that he is fit to perform one of the most important risk-management roles in the UK banking system. The question is not whether regulators approve experienced banking executives every day—they do. The question is whether the regulators responsible for approving the appointment have been provided with a complete picture of the governance environment Bocresion is inheriting. If significant unresolved issues, escalations, or ongoing reviews exist within NatWest’s risk function, the approval process becomes more than a routine administrative exercise. It becomes an opportunity to determine whether those issues have been properly identified, assessed, and addressed before responsibility for them is formally transferred to a new Chief Risk Officer.

The Government Review

The key question is – how long can the Government stall the Cabinet Office granted review into the NatWest Scandal? See here.

On 26 February 2026, Crown Commercial Service formally stated that it took procurement integrity and supplier conduct seriously, invited submission of evidence, and indicated a willingness to arrange meetings with relevant officials following a preliminary review. PropertyCorruption.com responded on 3 March, explaining that the evidential record ran to thousands of pages and requesting a discussion about scope, escalation routes, security concerns, accommodations, and process before submitting the first tranche of material. Weeks later, despite the stated seriousness of the allegations and repeated follow-up communications, no response had been provided.

That silence became increasingly difficult to explain as the timeline progressed. On 8 March, PropertyCorruption.com sent further correspondence to CCS and Brighton County Court seeking clarification regarding a court hearing listed on official systems. Neither recipient opened the email. Throughout the period, Rt Hon Nick Thomas-Symonds MP continued to receive updates regarding the allegations, the evidence, and the lack of engagement, yet no intervention was forthcoming. The issue is therefore no longer whether CCS initially took the matter seriously. The issue is whether a public commitment to review allegations was followed by meaningful action or quietly abandoned once engagement became inconvenient. If public bodies invite evidence, acknowledge receipt, and then cease engagement altogether, questions about accountability are not only legitimate—they become unavoidable.

For more information about the NatWest Scandal, see our former lead front page story below and also the document archive here.

Which Entities Will Be Most Impacted by the NatWest Scandal?

The NatWest Group Scandal (see full report here) can never be stopped. Why? Because the cover-up doesn’t rest on one smoking gun — it has four:

Could NatWest ever appoint another permanent Chief Risk Officer (see here)? Update: Abib Bocresion appointed as CRO starting July 2026.
The Government Cabinet Office granted a review into NatWest’s law firm, TLT LLP — then stopped opening emails.
Brighton County Court can’t correct the PCOL record without potentially uncovering serious wrongdoing.
Brighton Police refused to say which crime reports they were responding to.

Who is most exposed in the Scandal? We’d say these 10 entities:

TLT

TLT’s Disgraceful Letter and Our Response

Further TLT and Court Misstatements

Brighton Court:

Alleged Misconduct Involving Brighton County Court, TLT and NatWest Group

Oakley Property

Coole Bevis / Dean Wilson (new Update on 18 August 2026)

Were Coole Bevis Misled or Are They Trying to Mislead?

AXA:

Did AXA Just Try Yet Another Corruption Reset?

Nationwide:

Why Dame Crosbie should Lose Her Title and Ministers Be Sacked

Apax:

Does Bharet Patel of Apax have a conflict of interest?

Aston Vaughan

Everest Miles Contractors:

David Vaughan of Aston Vaughan: “That’s your problem”

Winkworth:

2025 emails ignored by Winkworth who continued marketing properties

Update 23 June 2026

The corrupt techniques employed across these entities are shockingly similar. For example, When the Cabinet Office orders a review into TLT LLP, the subsequent emails are ignored. Police reports are met with replies that refuse to specify which reports they are addressing. Brighton Court has ceased opening correspondence regarding shadow hearings, while just this week PCOL helpdesk feigns ignorance of the context then stops opening emails entirely.

Has perverting the course of justice and misconduct in public office become the standard playbook? While court customer investigations may still be opening emails, meaningful action remains unlikely. The PCOL helpdesk operates under the HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS), led by CEO Nick Goodwin (see above). Notably, PCOL Helpdesk avoid providing reference numbers or the surnames of those responding—a clear tactic to facilitate evasion and shield those involved from accountability?

Nick Goodwin has been informed of the broader scandal since May 2026:

June 24 Update

From Finimize Newsroom:

What they neglect to mention about Berenburg: The German financial regulator, BaFin, suspended Berenberg Bank’s executive board—including former CEO/Managing Partner Hendrik Riehmer and David Mortlock—over potential corporate governance breaches. As a result, former CEO Dr. Hans-Walter Peters and Michael Horf were appointed as special commissioners to assume responsibility for the bank’s management.

Berenburg and NatWest seem well aligned.

Update 7 July 2026

Harassment of property-corruption whistleblowers in train stations and rail networks

Concerns about the harassment of property-corruption whistleblowers across train stations and rail networks have now escalated to serious reports alleging active staff involvement in improper surveillance.

Will Network Rail CEO Jeremy Westlake request further information and ensure these allegations are independently examined, or will the organisation attempt to bury the issue?

They previously ignored our emails:

Update 30 July 2026 – National rail completely ignores further emails and the the inclusion in this article. Karen Stapleton General Counsel (National) at Network Rail has been added to legal priority investigation page, see here.

Update 7 Aug 2026 – Harassment and tracking continues, has Lucy D’Orsi (Chief Constable of Transport Police) being informed by National Rail?

Updated 18 September – There’s an interesting link between this scandal and Network Rail/Train Stations etc, in Oakley Property’s own words: see here.

Update 9 July 2026

Wilful Blindness of Systemic Corruption May Be the Biggest Crime

Systemic corruption rarely looks like a dramatic conspiracy; more often, it takes the form of a coordinated, institutional shrug where professionals simply choose to look the other way. A clear pattern emerges when observing how various supposedly independent bodies handle blatant anomalies.

The issues begin at the most basic levels of accountability. Police pretend that failing to specify which exact crime report they are referring to simply does not matter, stripping transparency from the investigative process.

Simultaneously, the legal infrastructure turns a blind eye to fundamental flaws. Brighton Court actively ignores that Possession Claims Online (PCOL) documentation is completely wrong, while the courts’ own PCOL IT administrators refuse to perform basic functions like resetting passwords, effectively blocking access to the system entirely.

This unified front of apathy extends deep into the property and legal sectors. Oakley Property ignores the reality that service charges have not been successfully chased for 21 months, operating alongside a fabricated service charge history. Furthermore, legal firms like Coole Bevis and Dean Wilson pretend that abruptly abandoning service charge collections against a backdrop of serious allegations is an entirely routine practice.

In the financial realm, the behavior is remarkably similar. Quilter employees lie about internal procedures, refuse to outline the full process, and unilaterally close complaints to bury the issue. Meanwhile, TLT and NatWest engage in a host of lies and omissions that further obscure the truth.

The list goes on, but the overarching theme remains identical across every institution. They are all doing the exact same thing by actively ignoring the corruption all around them, operating as if systemic corruption does not exist.

This creates a protective ring of wilful blindness where no single entity has to take responsibility as long as everyone agrees to feign ignorance. When the institutions designed to uphold the law and manage civil society weaponize bureaucracy to protect corrupt practices, it forces a devastating question. How many lives does this destroy on a daily basis we wonder?

Further Links

Want to learn more about the Scandal? You might be interested in the impact on:

Oakley Property

The Beginning of the End for Oakley Property? 12 June 2026

Keiran Foad

A Question of Transparency: The NatWest Scandal and Portugal’s Residency Dilemma 24 June 2026

The Education Sector

Bridget Phillipson and the NatWest Scandal 6 July 2026

Update 25 July 2026

One of the entities connected to the NatWest Scandal has retained Headland Consultancy to manage its communications response.

We do not correspond through external PR agencies. If the entity concerned wishes to engage directly and substantively with the issues we have raised, rather than attempting to reset the narrative through communications sent across three separate email addresses which pretend zero prior knowledge (a common tactic), we remain willing to speak with them.

We intend to record Headland’s involvement in the latest police report and in the material submitted for the live government review, including concerns about the tactics being used. We will also begin a broader review of Headland Consultancy (investigation page is here – password protected) and its role with other clients. As Lloyds Bank appears to fund Headland, we will also add it to our banking workstream here.

From their website:

Dan Mines, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) – Headland

Headland clients include Pret A Manger, Matalan, Carlsberg Britvic, Diageo, Premier Foods, Airbnb, PayPal, LinkedIn and Darktrace.

Should Headland not have an escalation process for cases involving police reports, government scrutiny and allegations as serious as attempted murder etc? A firm that claims to handle crises with “discretion and integrity” should assess whether an engagement is ethically appropriate, not simply manage the client’s reputation.

Update 31 July 2026

The appointment of a senior LSEG executive to a leadership role at NatWest (see here) raises legitimate concerns about the “revolving door” between major financial institutions and organisations involved in operating and overseeing UK markets. NatWest is listed on the London Stock Exchange, while LSEG owns the Exchange and provides market infrastructure, data and technology services. Although there is no evidence from the appointment alone that the executive was involved in regulatory decisions, market surveillance or any investigation concerning NatWest, such moves can create a perceived conflict of interest and weaken public confidence in the independence of market oversight.

Update 16 August 2026

After accepting emails for the last year, the Bank of England has now blocked us.

Andrew John Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England above. His own words in a speech in February 2026:

“Regulation should always be defined in terms of a positive purpose. In other words, we want to achieve an objective and regulation should help to do that. We should then design the precise regulatory regime that achieves this positive objective as quickly and effectively as possible whilst minimising any undesirable side effects.”

The objective of regulation is to stop corruption like the NatWest Scandal – we wonder whether he sees this as positive or negative?

Update 30 Aug 2026

It’s interesting how Andrew Bottomley — Connells Group — and Ash Piranie — Connells Group, Monument Bank (NED & Chair of Risk), GB Bank (Independent NED & Chair of Risk), plus Nexa Finance as a director — are linked to the NatWest scandal through Connells continuing to sell properties in impacted buildings while asking zero questions.

For us, this spells potential risk contagion to, for example, Monument Bank and GB Bank. As non-executive directors, they should be impartial — but are they really?

Read more about how Connells is involved here.

We see NED issues as having wide ranging consequences. For example, If credible issues arise concerning one of a bank’s NEDs through another board appointment, the bank would need to consider whether the matter is relevant to its D&O / management-liability insurance.

7 September 2026

Keiran Foad’s “travel” appears ongoing…

Update 9 September 2026

We wonder if Ms Churchill was told that TLT LLP is at the centre of a growing global Scandal? We also encourage her to read the full document archive on the scandal, see here. Feel free to contact us for passwords to secure documents propertycorruption@proton.me and additional evidence packs. You may also be interested in our legal workstream and Partners under investigation.

11 September 2026

Brown & Brown is still reshaping the business after the Risk Strategies acquisition. Eileen Akerson, Chief Legal Officer (see below), now oversees legal, regulatory, compliance and enterprise risk; Neil Krauter Sr., Executive Managing Director for Growth and Specialization, is leading growth and private-equity relationships; and P. Barrett Brown, former Retail segment president, stepped down from his officer and subsidiary roles in August 2026. The group is also running a wider transformation programme with McKinsey, Accenture and Anthropic.

We were surprised by the significant recent uptick in traffic relating to Brown & Brown’s role in this wider scandal. The relevant articles are currently password-protected because they form part of a broader insurance-sector investigation, but the renewed interest is notable, particularly given the timing of Brown & Brown’s ongoing integration and restructuring following the Risk Strategies acquisition.

Maybe it is time for Brown & Brown’s independent directors to take a closer look at this scandal and examine the company’s role in it. Those directors include H. Palmer Proctor Jr., Lead Independent Director and Chair of Nominating/Corporate Governance; Paul J. Krump, Chair of the Acquisition Committee; Jaymin B. Patel, Chair of the Audit Committee; Lawrence L. Gellerstedt III; James S. Hunt; Toni Jennings; Joia M. Johnson; Timothy R. M. Main; Bronislaw E. Masojada; Wendell Reilly; and Kathleen A. Savio. Given the renewed interest in Brown & Brown’s involvement, this would seem an appropriate time for independent oversight rather than leaving the issues solely with management.

Update 17 September 2026

TLT’s Response to High Court Mediation Request Raises Serious Bad-Faith Concerns

On 16 September 2026, NatWest and TLT LLP were sent a clear and formal Notice of Intended High Court Proceedings and Invitation to Mediation. The request was deliberately simple: before substantial proceedings were issued, would NatWest engage in independent mediation or another neutral ADR process?

TLT/Kam O’Neill (see picture below) responded the next day.

(for background on Ms O’Neill see this article Misleading About Conflict of Interest linked to attempted murder)

But instead of answering that question, the response sidestepped the proposed High Court proceedings and redirected the discussion back toward the existing mortgage litigation. In our view, that is not meaningful engagement with the correspondence that was actually sent.

The concern is not merely that TLT completely ignored the contents of the email. They acknowledged receipt of the High Court mediation invitation, yet didn’t mention anything about mediation That creates the appearance of selective engagement: responding sufficiently to create a record of having replied, while avoiding the central issue that required an answer.

That creates several features a court could potentially regard as relevant to conduct:

Selective engagement: they did not answer the central ADR question actually put to them.
Reframing: the proposed claim against NatWest was converted into a discussion about NatWest’s claim against resident.
Avoidance of the easiest question: “are you willing in principle?” They did not answer even that.
Procedural narrowing
Potential creation of a misleading paper trail: read in isolation, their phrase that the Bank is “keen to explore settlement of its claim” could later sound conciliatory, while not actually engaging with the ADR invitation you made regarding your claim.

A clarification was immediately sent asking TLT and NatWest to state plainly whether they were refusing mediation in relation to the proposed High Court proceedings. That should remove any possible ambiguity. If the question is again avoided, redirected or ignored, it will become increasingly difficult to portray the original response as an innocent misunderstanding.

The emerging concern is straightforward: was this genuine engagement, or an attempt to create the appearance of engagement while refusing to confront the actual High Court dispute?

At a minimum, the written record now establishes that the mediation invitation was received and that TLT’s first substantive response did not answer it. What NatWest and TLT do next may therefore be considerably more significant than the wording of their initial response.

It’s also telling that in the existing NatWest case – they also ignored all mediation requests

21 September 2026 Update

Today, a severe safety incident occurred aboard a passenger service, directly impacting a property whistleblower. Out of the entire train, the only automated doors that failed were precisely those the individual attempted to exit from, creating an immediate risk of serious physical harm.This was after other concerning staged incidents on the same train.

We hold grave concerns regarding this occurrence. Prior escalations and formal reports submitted to law enforcement have gone unaddressed, including persistent refusals to disclose relevant crime reference documentation.

Equally alarming was the response from station management and crew immediately after:

Staff falsely claimed that filming them in a public railway space is illegal. Before this the staff member was saying the incident could have been serious yet when filmed walked off.
The station manager claimed she had no way of knowing whether British Transport Police were on site, nor any means of contacting them if they were.
She further claimed she had no ability to identify or name the staff members operating the train.

The accompanying video documentation provides a clear record of events after the incident.

The NatWest Scandal: Should This Case Leapfrog to the Supreme Court?